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Do Recessions Accelerate
Routine-Biased
Technological Change?
ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
n The Great Recession
increased employers’ skill
requirements in their
job postings, and these
increases persisted as the
economy recovered.
n Employers in more
severely affected areas were
also more likely to increase
their IT investments as they
“upskilled” their jobs.
n A permanent shift in
the demand for skills and
technology helps explain
why laid-off workers faced
difficulty in reemployment.
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Evidence from Vacancy Postings
Brad Hershbein, Upjohn Institute
Lisa B. Kahn, Yale University
The employment shift from occupations in the
middle of the skill distribution toward those at the
high and low ends is one of the most important
trends to affect the U.S. labor market over the
past 30 years. Previous research has suggested
that a primary driver of this job polarization is
routine-biased technological change (RBTC),
whereby new technologies substitute for middleskill jobs and complement high-skill cognitive
jobs (Autor and Dorn 2013; Autor, Levy, Murnane
2003). Think of word processors replacing typists
or engineers using AutoCAD software. Until
recently, RBTC had been thought to be a gradual,
secular phenomenon. However, a long theoretical
literature, beginning with Joseph Schumpeter’s
(1939) “creative destruction,” suggests that
adjustments to technological change, writ large,
may be more episodic. In boom times, high
opportunity costs, or frictions such as adjustment
costs, may inhibit resources from being reallocated
optimally in the face of technological change.
Recessions, in contrast, lower the opportunity cost
and can produce large enough shocks to overcome
these frictions.
Whether adjustments to new technology are
gradual or sudden is important for policy and for
our understanding of recoveries. The recoveries
from the last three U.S. recessions (1991, 2001,
2007–2009) have been jobless: employment was
slow to rebound despite recovery in aggregate
output. If adjustments are sudden and concentrated
in downturns, large numbers of displaced workers
may be left with the wrong skills for new modes of
production.

Skill Demand and the Great Recession
This article highlights findings from a recent
working paper that investigates how the demand for
skills changed during and after the Great Recession
(Hershbein and Kahn 2016). Using nearly all
electronically posted job vacancies in 2007 and
2010–2015 collected by the analytics company
Burning Glass Technologies and spatial variation
in economic conditions, we establish a new fact:
the skill requirements in job ads increase in
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) that suffered
larger employment shocks in the Great Recession
relative to the same areas before the shock and
other areas that experienced smaller shocks.1
As shown in the top two panels of Figure 1,
our estimates imply that between 2007 and 2010,
ads posted in hard-hit metro areas became about
5 percentage points (16 percent) more likely to
contain education and experience requirements
than ads posted in less-affected metro areas. Ads in
hard-hit MSAs also became about 2–3 percentage
points (8‒12 percent) more likely to state
requirements for cognitive and computer skills
(Panels C and D of Figure 1).
Moreover, the vast majority of this “upskilling”
does not fade away but instead persists through the
end of our sample in 2015. That is, even while most
measures of local labor-market strength—such as
the unemployment rate, job growth, and the share
of the population working—have converged back
to prerecession levels, differences in advertised
skill demands remain. This holds true even when
we statistically control for the availability of
skilled labor and the composition of ads across
firms and occupations. In fact, we find that this

EMPLOYMENT RESEARCH • OCTOBER 2017

W.E. UPJOHN INSTITUTE

Do Recessions Accelerate Routine-Biased Technological Change?

Figure 1 Effect of MSA-Specific Great Recession Employment Shock on Skill Demand in Job
Postings - Panel A
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upskilling occurs almost entirely
within occupations, and that the same
firms that upskilled by 2010 drive the
persistence later in our sample period.
Technology Adoption
These patterns collectively suggest
that a structural shift in the demand
for skill occurred disproportionately
in harder-hit areas. Why might that
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have happened? Notably, the skill
requirements we analyze—education,
experience, cognitive, and computer—
have been found to complement
routine-biased technologies. If a
structural shift in line with RBTC is
occurring, we would expect changes
in these skill requirements also to
be accompanied by an accelerated
adoption of such technologies.

Indeed, we find that increases in
skill requirements are correlated with
capital investments for both MSAs
and individual firms. Using the Ci
Technology Database from HarteHanks, a market intelligence firm, we
show that businesses in harder-hit
MSAs exhibited faster adoption of
personal computers at the same time
that they upskilled in job postings.
These differences emerge only after the
Great Recession and, once again, persist
through our sample period. We are also
able to link firms in our job postings
database to those in the Harte-Hanks
database, as well as to publicly traded
firms in the Compustat database, which
contains measures of physical capital
(property, plant, and equipment).
We show that the firms with greater
increases in capital investments,
either PC adoption or physical capital
holdings, are also more likely to upskill
in their job postings.
Routine Jobs
Furthermore, if this increased
investment and upskilling is in fact
related to routine-biased technologies,
we would expect to see the strongest
changes to labor characteristics for
the jobs most susceptible to such
technologies—ones that involve
routine, codifiable tasks. We distinguish
routine-cognitive occupations (e.g.,
clerical, administrative, and sales)
from routine-manual ones (e.g.,
production and operatives). For
routine-manual occupations, we
find evidence consistent with firms’
substitution of technology for labor—a
sharp increase in layoff risk for workers
in harder-hit areas early in the Great
Recession, followed by persistently
depressed employment level with little
impact on skill requirements. This
is the traditional view exhibited in
studies of job polarization and in the
popular press of the fear of automation:
employment losses concentrated in
occupations we expect to be most
readily replaceable by machines.
However, in contrast to this
conventional view of labor substitution,
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routine-cognitive occupations in
harder-hit MSAs surprisingly exhibit
only modest increases in layoff risk and
no relative employment losses. Instead,
we show that these occupations
experience pronounced upskilling,
as well as modest relative wage and
employment growth after the recession.
That is, rather than disappearing
entirely, surviving routine-cognitive
occupations appear to have become
both relatively higher-skilled and
more productive. These occupations
thus became less routine—and more
cognitive—because of the Great
Recession.
Conclusion
During the recovery from the
Great Recession, anecdotal evidence
suggests that the composition of new
hires shifted toward higher-skilled
workers, resulting in many workers
being “overeducated” for their jobs
(Burning Glass Technologies 2014).
However, it was not clear how broad,
deep, or enduring these effects were, or
the extent to which they were driven
by labor supply or labor demand
responses.
The evidence we bring to
bear supports that shifts in skill
requirements in the aftermath of the
recession reflect technologically driven
changes in the means of production,
not just changes in whom firms seek to
hire. As hypothesized by many other
researchers, these kinds of episodic,
productivity-enhancing changes
can result in jobless recovery. Our
findings are thus extremely relevant for
policymakers, who allocate billions of
taxpayer dollars to subsidize workers’
job searches in a downturn.
The U.S. economy has seen
remarkable changes over the past 30
years, brought on by the computer
revolution and globalization. These
changes have led to great increases
in productivity and wealth, but the
benefits have not been shared among
all workers. Indeed, a large population
of workers, formerly employed in
routine-task jobs, have suffered
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Figure 1 Panel C
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NOTE: Figures show the change in likelihood of a job posting having the listed requirement, relative to 2007,
for an MSA at the 90th percentile of the Great Recession employment shock compared to an MSA at the 10th
percentile. For example, the Education Requirement graph shows that between 2007 and 2010 the probability
of a job posting listing an education requirement increased by 5.3 percentage points more in a hard-hit MSA
than a less-affected MSA.
SOURCE: Hershbein and Kahn (2016).

permanent labor market, health, and
social consequences from structural
changes in the economy. Our results
highlight that a worker’s ability to adjust
to these changes may be especially

difficult because the changes are
sudden, concentrated in recessions.
If the changes to production instead
occurred more gradually, workers
would still need to be retrained, but
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fewer of them at any given time, and
with more time in which to do it.
Instead, large numbers of workers
can find their skills depreciated at the
same time, with limited prospect of
finding comparable reemployment.
Public policy has yet to figure out
how to reallocate workers on a large
scale following a recession, or provide
training in the new skills demanded
by employers, but the need to do so is
likely only to grow.
NOTE
1. We rank 381 MSAs in the United States
according to the predicted change in
employment growth between 2006 and
2009. For ease in interpretation, we define
a “hard-hit” MSA as one that experienced
an employment shock at the 90th percentile
(in absolute value, so that 1 in 10 MSAs had
a worse shock), and compare this “hardhit” MSA to one that experienced a 10th
percentile shock (so that 1 in 10 MSAs had
a milder shock).
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The 2008 Economic
Stimulus Payments
Increased Emotional
Well-Being
Marta Lachowska
Over the past few decades,
economists have become more
interested in understanding the
determinants of subjective well-being
(SWB).1 For example, SWB has been
used to study the welfare trade-off
between inflation and unemployment
(Di Tella, MacCulloch, and Oswald
2001), welfare costs of business cycles
(Wolfers 2003), the need to interact
with others (Krueger and Schkade
2008), and mental costs of job loss
(Clark and Oswald 1994). However,
perhaps the best-known application of
SWB in economics has been to answer
the question, “Does more income make
you happier?”
This article highlights findings
recently published in the Journal of
Human Resources, in which Lachowska
(2017) estimates the effect of income
on SWB using exogenous variation
in the timing of the 2008 economic
stimulus tax rebate payments. Because
the rebates were disbursed using a
close-to-random schedule of payment,
the tax rebate program offers an
attractive setting for identifying the
effect of a medium-sized income
change on SWB, measured as life
satisfaction, health satisfaction, or
emotional well-being (also known as
affect).

As the United States entered the
Great Recession in February 2008,
the Bush administration proposed
an economic stimulus package that
included tax rebates to low- and
middle-income families with the goal
of increasing household spending.
Eligibility for the tax rebates was
determined by the previous year’s tax
returns. The payments ranged between
$300 and $600 for individual tax filers
and between $600 and $1,200 for joint
filers, and the average value of the tax
rebate payment was about $1,000.
An interesting feature of the
economic stimulus package was that
the U.S. Treasury did not disburse the
rebates all at once, but instead opted
for a sequential payment schedule that
depended on the last two digits of the
filer’s Social Security number (SSN). As
these two digits of the SSN are assigned
randomly, the timing of when someone
received a payment was also as good as
random.
The randomized timing of rebate
disbursement is valuable for at least
two reasons. First, it allows me to
estimate if rebates actually cause
well-being to increase. Second, several
papers have shown that the rebates
had a positive effect on household

ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
n This research estimates the effect of income on emotional well-being using the
close-to-random variation in the timing of the disbursement of the 2008 tax rebate
payments.
n The findings show that receiving the rebate had a very positive effect on emotional
well-being, mainly stemming from a reduction in stress and worry.
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show that the increase in emotional
well-being stems from a statistically
significant decrease in the probability
that respondents experience feelings
of stress and worry. These decreases
are also economically meaningful:
among rebate recipients, the likelihood
of reporting worry is reduced by 41
percentage points, and the likelihood
of reporting stress is reduced by 40
percentage points. Together these
findings suggest that additional income
may temporarily improve emotional
well-being.
That the tax rebates had an
impact on reducing stress and worry
is interesting because research in
behavioral economics has argued
that better emotional well-being, at
least in the short run, can increase
patience, improve the short-run
ability to make informed economic
decisions, and strengthen cognitive
capacity. Interestingly, low-income

people in particular seem to benefit
from better emotional well-being. For
example, Mani et al. (2013) show that
experimentally inducing low-income
people to think about a hypothetical

That the tax rebates had an impact
on reducing stress and worry is
interesting because research in
behavioral economics has argued
that better emotional well-being can
increase patience and strengthen
cognitive capacity.
financial problem leads to a decrease in
their cognitive abilities. Mullainathan
and Shafir (2013) discuss the results
of this study and draw broader
implications for the effects of liquidity
constraints. The authors hypothesize

Figure 1 The Effect of Receiving Rebate on Various Emotions
10%
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spending; see, for example, Parker
et al. (2013). Hence, given that the
rebates had a causal effect on actual
choices (such as spending), finding
that the rebates also had an effect on
a subjective assessment of well-being
can be viewed as a way to validate the
usefulness of SWB as an economic
measure. To measure the rebate effect
on SWB, I use the Gallup-Healthways
Daily Poll, a survey that collects
information on several measures of
subjective well-being on a day-to-day
basis, as well as a question on whether
the respondents had received a tax
rebate. To answer whether the tax
rebates had an effect on SWB, I use
regression analysis to compare the
SWB of rebate recipients to the SWB of
nonrecipients.
There are two main findings. The
results show that receiving the rebate
increased emotional well-being by
0.60 of a standard deviation, which
is a substantial gain.2 Furthermore,
the observed increase in emotional
well-being is even stronger—over
one standard deviation—for lowerincome respondents. Finding that
lower-income respondents react more
strongly to the rebates suggests the
presence of binding credit constraints,
although this test is only indirect.
For the remaining two measures, life
satisfaction and health satisfaction,
the results do not turn out to be
statistically significant or robust and
are omitted from this newsletter.
Figure 1 shows which emotions
are responsible for the large increase
in emotional well-being. This is done
by separately estimating the effect of
receiving the tax rebate on each of
the seven components of emotional
well-being (worry, stress, anger, pain,
sadness, enjoyment, or happiness).
Although the estimates show that
receiving the rebate increased feelings
of enjoyment and happiness and
decreased daily feelings of pain,
sadness, anger, worry, and stress, only
the last two changes are statistically
different from zero. Hence, the results
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that reminding low-income subjects
about money may reduce their
cognitive capacity because it increases
distress, which in turn limits the
subject’s capacity for processing
problems. In fact, a link between
liquidity constraints and emotional

The results suggest that the rebates
may have had a yet unaccounted-for
benefit that should be considered in
the discussions of proposed policies,
such as the universal basic income.
distress may explain why low-income
people sometimes make poor financial
decisions (Shah, Mullainathan, and
Shafir 2012). Support for this is also
echoed in other psychological research.
Isen (2001) states in her literature
review that “positive affect enhances
problem solving and decision making.”
If relaxing liquidity constraints
increases emotional well-being, and if
this increase in emotional well-being
can in turn improve economic decision
making, then the results suggest
that the rebates may have had a yet
unaccounted-for benefit that should
be considered in the discussions of
proposed policies such as the universal
basic income. A natural extension of
this research would be to examine the
effects of other income-replacement
policies on emotional well-being. More
broadly, future research should focus
on gaining a better understanding
of the mechanisms that generate the
interdependency between income,
emotional well-being, and economic
behavior.
NOTES
1. This article draws heavily on Lachowska
(2017). An earlier version of this paper is
available as an Upjohn Institute working
paper; see Lachowska (2015).
2. Emotional well-being is an index based
on seven emotions (“Did you experience

6

the following feelings a lot yesterday:
enjoyment, happiness, physical pain, worry,
sadness, stress, anger?”), each measured
as either a “yes” or a “no.” Emotional
well-being is computed by subtracting the
average of questions on negative emotions
from the average of questions on positive
emotions.
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New Books from the Upjohn Press
The STEM Dilemma

Skills that Matter to Regions
Fran Stewart
Fran Stewart dives into the murky waters where
education and economic goals meet to confront
several key issues facing policymakers and
educators, including the role of public investment
in human capital,
the types of human
capital investment
that provide the
greatest public
return, and whether
those investments
should vary by
region. Her detailed
findings provide
evidence that not
all high-paying jobs require STEM skills; that not
all good-paying, highly skilled STEM jobs require
college degrees; and that “soft skills” (e.g., critical
thinking and communication) are important for
STEM as well as other high-paying jobs.
Stewart notes that STEM graduates are important
for the overall economy, yet not all regions are
home to the types of industries that rely on
workers with STEM skills. For example, there is
a fivefold difference between regions with the
largest share of high-STEM employment and
those with the smallest. Policy preoccupation
with promoting STEM degrees may be
overlooking other types of training that may yield
greater economic benefit. This suggests that by
adopting one-size-fits-all strategies for human
capital development, regions may be failing to
reap the greatest possible returns on their public
investments.
Stewart’s analysis and findings will be of interest
to anyone involved in workforce development and
regional economic development.
222 pp. 2017
$20 paper 978-0-88099-639-6
$40 cloth 978-0-88099-640-2

Confronting Policy
Challenges of the
Great Recession

Lessons for Macroeconomic
Policy
Eskander Alvi, Editor
This book brings together a notable group of
authors who describe the unprecedented events
and the often-extraordinary policies put in
place to limit the damage suffered during the
Great Recession
and then to put the
economy back on a
growth track. Not
surprisingly, some
policies succeeded
while others barely
made a dent. The
analysis of the
many lessons and
encounters, and
successes and failures, offers fresh perspectives on
how to manage the economy in a future crisis of
comparable proportion.
In the years following the Great Recession,
research has been conducted on the lessons
learned from the event, but an appreciation of the
accompanying challenges, such as that presented
here, adds value and enriches policy content.
The hindsight afforded by the Great Recession
is invaluable, and the chapters in this book
underscore the dire issues policymakers faced.
Contributors include Barry Eichengreen, Gary
Burtless, Donald Kohn, Laurence Ball, J. Bradford
DeLong, Lawrence H. Summers, and Kathryn M.E.
Dominguez.
146 pp. 2017
$15 paper 978-0-88099-636-5
$40 cloth 978-0-88099-637-2

Lessons Learned from
Public Workforce
Program Experiments
Stephen A. Wandner, Editor
This book presents an analysis of the lessons
learned from public workforce experiments that
have been conducted
and evaluated in the
United States. The U.S.
Department of Labor
(USDOL) has sponsored
a number of these
experiments over
many decades, and
some of them have
resulted in significant
public workforce
program and policy improvements. The USDOL
has been a leader in making use of rigorous
evaluations of existing workforce programs and in
the development of new public program options.
These experimental evaluations of public
workforce programs have included training
programs—the Job Training Partnership
Act (JTPA) and the Workforce Investment Act
(WIA)—and the Job Corps. Another effort
was a series of unemployment insurance (UI)
experiments that were conducted in the 1980s
and 1990s to test new or improved reemployment
approaches. More recently, experimental
evaluations of a UI work-search eligibility
review and reemployment services program
(Reemployment and Eligibility Assessment).
The contributors to this book show that public
workforce program experiments have provided
solid evidence on which policymakers have been
able to make informed and helpful decisions that
have benefitted America’s workers.
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